Lecture 7: Extensive-form game

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Sequential Game


- A major class of "dynamic games", where players take their de cisions in a certain predefined order
- Role of information at each stage: very important
 - Perfect/imperfect information
- Thus, distinguish between action vs. strategy
 - Example: if an individual has to decide what to do in the evening, and the options are camping or staying at home;
 - Strategy: "If the weather report predicts dry weather for the evening, then I will go out camping; otherwise, I will stay at home"
 - Action: After knowing about the weather, the individual would take an action

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
- So far, "Simultaneous play"
- What happens if a game is played sequentially
 - One player can see what other player chooses, and then decides on its strategy
- Equilibrium?
- What other issues?


Game Trees (Extensive form)

- Extensive-form (i.e., tree)
 - Most useful representation of sequential games
 - Discrete strategy space
- Game represented as a tree
 - each non-leaf node represents a decision point for some player
 - edges represent available choices
- Can be converted to matrix game (Normal form)
 - "plan of action" must be chosen beforehand




technology (.net or java)Microsoft moves first, then Mozilla makes its move






Can we look at an extensive-form game from its associated normal form game?

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




exponential growth in number of strategies

How should I characterize "real equilibriums" in extensive-form games?

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• full tree, left tree, right tree

Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium

- Def: a NEP is subgame perfect if its restriction to every subgame is also a NEP of the subgame
- Thr: Every extensive form game has at least one subgame perferct Nash equilibrium
 - Kuhn's theorem, based on backward induction

What is a good algorithm to find equilibria in extensive-form game?

Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Microsoft (N, NN) is not a NEP when re

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(N, NJ) is a subgame perfect

Subgame Perfect NEP

Not subgame Perfect NEP

Nash equilibrium

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Solving the Game (Backward Induction)

• Starting from terminal nodes move up the game tree making best choice ava .ne Best strategy for Mozilla: .net, java java .net⁄ java (follow Microsoft) 0,0 2, 2 1, 0 3. Equilibrium ava Best strategy for outcome Microsoft: .net 2.2 3.1 Single NEP • Microsoft \rightarrow .net, Mozilla \rightarrow .net, java

