


Lecture 5: Potential Game

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Contents

- There exists some special games with "beautiful" properties
- One great example is "Potential Game"
- What "beautiful" properties?
- What is Potential Game?

Potential games



Potential Game: Summary

- A special class of non-cooperative games having a special structure
- The variations of the users' utilities can be captured by a single function known as the potential function
- Potential games are characterized by their simplicity and the existence or uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium solution
- Often, potential games are useful when dealing with continuous-kernel games

Potential Game

• Formally,

Definition 18 A noncooperative strategic game $(\mathcal{N}, (\mathcal{S}_i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}}, (u_i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}})$ is an exact (cardinal) potential game if there exists an exact potential function $\Phi : S \to \mathbb{R}$ such that $\forall i \in \mathcal{N}$

$$\Phi(x, \mathbf{s}_{-i}) - \Phi(z, \mathbf{s}_{-i}) = u_i(x, \mathbf{s}_{-i}) - u_i(z, \mathbf{s}_{-i}), \ \forall x, z \in S_i, \forall \mathbf{s} \in S.$$
(3.28)

A game is a <u>general (ordinal) potential game</u> if there is an ordinal potential function $\Phi : S \to \mathbb{R}$ such that

$$sgn[\Phi(x, s_{-i}) - \Phi(z, s_{-i})] = sgn[u_i(x, s_{-i}) - u_i(z, s_{-i})], \forall x, z \in S_i, \forall s \in S, (3.29)$$

where sgn denotes the sign function.

 In exact potential games, the difference in individual utilities achieved by each player when changing unilaterally its strategy has the same value as the difference in values of the potential function. In ordinal potential games, only the signs of the differences have to be the same.

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Example: Prisoner's Dilemma

- A potential function assigns a real value for every $s \in S$.
- Thus, when we represent the game payoffs with a matrix (in finite games), we can also represent the potential function as a matrix, each entry corresponding to the vector of strategies from the payoff matrix.

Example

The matrix P is a potential for the "Prisoner's dilemma" game described below:

$$G = \begin{pmatrix} (1,1) & (9,0) \\ (0,9) & (6,6) \end{pmatrix}, \qquad P = \begin{pmatrix} 4 & 3 \\ 3 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$





Pure Strategy NE: Existence


Theorem


Every finite ordinal potential game has at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Intuition?










Does there exist a famous and representative potential game?

Yes! Congestion Game

But, you will see more surprising result soon!

Congestion Game: Example

- Three players from S to T
- a/b/c: cost when one/two/three players use that road
- Total cost of each player is the aggregate link cost over its path





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Congestion Game: Formal Model

Congestion Model: $C = \langle \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{M}, (S_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}, (c^j)_{j \in \mathcal{M}} \rangle$ where:

- $\mathcal{I} = \{1, 2, \cdots, I\}$ is the set of players.
- $\mathcal{M} = \{1, 2, \cdots, m\}$ is the set of resources.
- S_i is the set of resource combinations (e.g., links or common resources) that player i can take/use. A strategy for player i is s_i ∈ S_i, corresponding to the subset of resources that this player is using.
- c^j(k) is the benefit for the negative of the cost to each user who uses resource j if k users are using it.
- Define congestion game $\langle \mathcal{I}, (S_i), (u_i) \rangle$ with utilities


$$u_i(s_i,s_{-i})=\sum_{j\in s_i}c^j(k_j),$$


where k_j is the number of users of resource j under strategy s.


Congestion Game is a Potential Game

Theorem (Rosenthal (73))

Every congestion game is a potential game and thus has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.







Congestion game is not just an example

• Theorem

- Each exact potential game has its equivalent congestion game.

• Hmm...



Potential game for continuous strategy set

- In the earlier slides,
 - Mainly, discrete, finite number of strategies
- Clearly, we can apply almost the similar principle to continuous strategy cases.

- Example?

- Conditions under which NE exists or even it is unqiue?

How can we see some game is a potential game or not?

• We will see them later ...

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Summary



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Pure Strategy NE: Existence

Theorem

Every finite ordinal potential game has at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Proof: The global maximum of an ordinal potential function is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. To see this, suppose that s* corresponds to the global maximum. Then, for any i ∈ I, we have, by definition, Φ(s^{*}_i, s^{*}_{-i}) – Φ(s, s^{*}_{-i}) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S_i. But since Φ is a potential function, for all i and all s ∈ S_i,

$$u_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}^*) - u_i(s, s_{-i}^*) \ge 0$$
 iff $\Phi(s_i^*, s_{-i}^*) - \Phi(s, s_{-i}^*) \ge 0$.

Therefore, $u_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}^*) - u_i(s, s_{-i}^*) \ge 0$ for all $s \in S_i$ and for all $i \in \mathcal{I}$. Hence s^* is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

• Note, however, that there may also be other pure strategy Nash equilibria corresponding to local maxima.



Theorem (Rosenthal (73))

Every congestion game is a potential game and thus has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Proof: For each j define kⁱ_j as the usage of resource j excluding player i, i.e.,

$$ar{k}^i_j = \sum_{i'
eq i} {f I} \left[j \in s_{i'}
ight]$$
 ,

where $I[j \in s_{i'}]$ is the indicator for the event that $j \in s_{i'}$.

 With this notation, the utility difference of player *i* from two strategies s_i and s'_i (when others are using the strategy profile s_{-i}) is

$$u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) - u_i(s'_i, s_{-i}) = \sum_{j \in s_i} c^j(\bar{k}^j_j + 1) - \sum_{j \in s'_i} c^j(\bar{k}^j_j + 1).$$



• Now consider the function

$$\Phi(s) = \sum_{j \in \bigcup_{i' \in \mathcal{I}} s_{i'}} \left[\sum_{k=1}^{k_j} c^j(k) \right]$$

• We can also write

$$\Phi(s_i, s_{-i}) = \sum_{\substack{j \in \bigcup_{i' \neq i} s_{i'}}} \left[\sum_{k=1}^{k_j^i} c^j(k) \right] + \sum_{j \in s_i} c^j(\bar{k}_j^i + 1).$$



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• Therefore:

$$\begin{split} \Phi(s_i, s_{-i}) - \Phi(s'_i, s_{-i}) &= \sum_{j \in \bigcup_{i' \neq i} s_{i'}} \left[\sum_{k=1}^{k_j^i} c^j(k) \right] + \sum_{j \in s_i} c^j(\bar{k}_j^i + 1) \\ &- \sum_{j \in \bigcup_{i' \neq i} s_{i'}} \left[\sum_{k=1}^{\bar{k}_j^i} c^j(k) \right] + \sum_{j \in s'_i} c^j(\bar{k}_j^i + 1) \\ &= \sum_{j \in s_i} c^j(\bar{k}_j^i + 1) - \sum_{j \in s'_i} c^j(\bar{k}_j^i + 1) \\ &= u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) - u_i(s'_i, s_{-i}). \end{split}$$